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The ontological paradigms of Schelling and the late Merleau-Ponty bear 
striking resemblances to Spinoza’s ontology. Both were developed in 
response to transcendental models of a Cartesian mold, resisting tendencies 
to exalt the human ego to the neglect or the detriment of the more-than-
human world. As such, thinkers with environmental concerns have sought to 
derive favorable ethical prescriptions on their basis. We begin by discerning 
a deadlock between two such thinkers: Ted Toadvine and Sean McGrath. 
With ecological responsibility in mind, both actually resist Spinozist 
reduction of the human being to the status of a mere mode among modes. 
But despite having the same general aim, they end up endorsing contrary 
practical conclusions. Our objective is to pinpoint the reasons behind this 
deadlock, indicative of two strands of post-Spinozist environmental thought 
which stand in tension, and to begin to propose an integrative way forward. 
The ethical weight afforded by Toadvine to the notion of resistance in the 
work of the late Merleau-Ponty, namely nature’s resistance to harmonizing, 
unifying pretensions, invites inquiry into two Merleau-Pontean notions he 
does not address: the barbarian principle, and the proposal to “Do a 
Psychoanalysis of Nature.” We trace these to their origins in the works of 
Schelling’s middle period, arguing that the Schellingian location of 
resistance in Spirit’s dark ground—alternately conceived as primordial 
Dionysiac madness, bottled-up within the substratum of consciousness—
lends to an understanding of the human, and human responsibility, that 
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 Human being: a mere mode among modes, or set apart from the rest of nature in a 
manner that entails specific ontological significance? 1  One’s answer will have important 
implications for environmental ethics. Our point of departure is the relation between two 
continental philosophers whose respective ontologies bear striking resemblances to Spinoza’s, 
itself a response to the Cartesian reduction of nature to the objectionable status of extension.2 
The first is the late Merleau-Ponty, whose cryptic, ontological proposal to “Do a 
Psychoanalysis of Nature” is well-known (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 267). The second is Schelling, 
whose ontological reflections on pre-reflective being have proved to be of central importance for 
Merleau-Ponty’s late proposal, and whose career-spanning meditations on the problem of ground 
led him to conceive of nature as the dark ground of Spirit. The likenesses to Spinoza’s paradigm 
are not accidental; Spinoza held a place of primary influence in Schelling’s thought, which in 
turn, through Schelling and others, influenced Merleau-Ponty. 
Schelling’s influence upon Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology has received merited, recent 
emphasis. 3  Our instigating question arises not so much from the literature on the relation 
between these thinkers, but rather from a seeming contradiction that has arisen in reading and 
comparing the work of two contemporary thinkers with environmental concerns, each of whom 
has been influenced by one of our two philosophers of nature. Having inherited Spinoza-inspired 
ontological paradigms through Merleau-Ponty and Schelling, Ted Toadvine and Sean McGrath 
both seek to transition from ontological reflection to ethical implementation. 
The goal of the present inquiry is to suggest a path beyond a seeming contradiction that 
has arisen from reading and comparing their work, and our first section will begin by clarifying 
what that contradiction is (I). Responding to those who accentuate the “kinship” in Merleau-
Ponty’s “strange kinship,” but who fail to heed the “strange,” Toadvine’s emphasis on resistance 
invites further inquiry into two Merleau-Pontean notions that Toadvine does not address. The 
first of these is Merleau-Ponty’s proposal to “Do a Psychoanalysis of Nature,” in conjunction 
with his late view that phenomenology and psychoanalysis converge in following their respective 
investigations into the substratum of consciousness (II). The second is his notion of the barbarian 
principle. To disambiguate this notion, and to draw out its ethical implications, we situate two of 
Merleau-Ponty’s quotations of Schelling’s Ages of the World against the backdrop of his middle 
works (III). Both notions are traced back to their inception in the dark ground of Spirit. 
Dionysiac desire, bottled up and repressed, can be released in one of two therapeutic ways, 
                                                          
1 My gratitude is due to Paul Moyaert, Gadamer Chair at Boston College during the 2017-2018 academic year, 
whose zeal as a teacher and love as a learner have been influential for my development and the composition of this 
essay. I’d also like to thank Richard Atkins, whose careful criticisms and feedback on an earlier conference draft 
challenged me to transform a paper that was in otherwise poor shape. Additionally, I’d like to acknowledge and 
express my thanks to those present at the meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy at 
SPEP in Pittsburgh (November 2019), at which I presented a draft: especially Bryan Bannon, for his kind disposition 
and engaging correspondence over the past few years, and thoughtful comments in response to this paper in 
particular; Rachel Jones, for her kindness and encouragement; and Josh Hayes, for much of the same. Finally, I 
express my thanks to two anonymous reviewers at the Journal of the Pacific Association for the Continental 
Tradition, along with its editor, Chris Lauer, whose comments, requests, and suggestions for further clarification 
have very much helped to improve the essay and to smooth out its rough edges. 
2 That is, the debates between anthropocentrists and biocentrists in the field of environmental philosophy fall beyond 
the scope of the present work. 
3 See for example the volume edited by Jason Wirth and Patrick Burke, The Barbarian Principle: Merleau-Ponty, 
Schelling, and the Question of Nature (Wirth and Burke 2013), and Dylan Trigg, “‘The Indestructible, the Barbaric 
Principle’: The Role of Schelling in Merleau-Ponty’s Psychoanalysis,” which argues for necessity of returning to 
Schelling in order to make sense of Merleau-Ponty’s cryptic proposal to “Do a Psychoanalysis of Nature” (Trigg 
2016). 
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represented by Toadvine and McGrath: the Nietzschean and the Schellingian, respectively. But 
in the absence of further argumentation, it would appear that only one of these is both 
psychologically healthful and ethically mindful (IV). 
Our thesis is as follows: Merleau-Ponty’s intensifying focus on the common flesh of the 
body and of the world, along with the themes of resistance, the barbarian principle, and the late 
proposal to “Do a Psychoanalysis of Nature,” ought to lead us into shadowlands from which we 
can discover anew the source of our very need for an ethics of ecological responsibility. 
Merleau-Ponty himself stands on the cusp of this insight, but his reading of Schelling in the 
Nature lectures does not attend to the development of Schelling’s thought quite closely enough. 
 
 
I. Environmental Groundwork 
 
Considering the Spinozist lineage, one salient similarity between Ted Toadvine, who 
utilizes insights gleaned from Merleau-Ponty and the philosophy of nature in his environmental 
thought, and Sean McGrath, who does likewise with Schelling and psychoanalysis, is that 
Toadvine and McGrath alike resist the consequences of reducing the human to the ontological 
status of a mere mode among modes. And both do so with an eye to the problems that the elision 
of ontological difference, or homogenization of the human and the rest of nature, produces for 
environmental ethics. 
McGrath takes the stronger stance when it comes to this point. In response to post-
humanist tendencies in those inspired in particular by Deleuze and Guattari, his headline is clear: 
“Naturalism without humanism produces a flattened ontology in which nothing is particularly 
good or evil” (McGrath 2018, p. 102; henceforth Difference). His essay “In Defense of the 
Human Difference” begins boldly, with the following. 
 
The common denial of the significance of human consciousness and freedom 
among eco-critics—the denial of the human difference—creates more problems 
for environmental philosophy than it solves. We will not break through to 
sustainable living by jettisoning the basic achievements of Western philosophy. 
Such a transcendence of our history is not even possible. And when it is tried, 
monsters are produced. It is not clear, for example, why the cockroaches 
shouldn’t inherit the earth if there is nothing particularly distinct about us, as in 
Morton’s “ecological thought.” Nor is it clear on what moral grounds one could 
critique the self-maximizing capitalist for his ecological abuse if there is no such 
thing as moral grounds for anything. Naturalism without humanism produces a 
flattened ontology in which nothing is particularly good or evil. The proposed 
alternatives for ecology to some form of humanism are for the most part 
variations on Spinozism, either in a deep ecological or Deleuzian form, wherein 
we substitute the amoral good/bad dyad for real moral difference. For a 
thoroughgoing Spinozism there is nothing intrinsically wrong about the current 
destruction of the habitats of non-human animals for the sake of expanding human 
civilization. It is no doubt in our best interest to live more “sustainably,” but that 
is a simple utilitarian calculus which does not challenge the ethics of the self-
maximizer in any important way. We ought to recall that Spinoza’s argument for 
why we should treat others well is that it is better to be surrounded by friends 
4  C. Rogers 
rather than enemies—i.e., the utilitarian calculus. When we recall that utilitarian 
thinking is the very core of ecological degradation—everything reduced to 
exchange-value (in Marx’s language)—the conundrum facing political ecology 
becomes clear: naturalism without humanism leaves us with nothing but the ethics 
of capitalism. (Difference, pp. 101-102) 
 
Such flattened ontologies, in other words, place the thinker beyond good and evil in such a way 
as to sweep away viable grounds for environmental responsibility. McGrath develops these 
arguments in detail in his recent book, Thinking Nature: An Essay in Negative Ecology.4 
Toadvine’s resistance develops not so much out of an aversion to flattened ontology, per 
se. It arises in response to those who take the work of the late Merleau-Ponty as a point of 
departure, attempting to derive grounds for environmental ethics on the basis of an ontological 
kinship between the human and the rest of nature. 5  Without going so far as to commend 
ecologically minded humanism, he poses the following challenge to those “on the rebound 
against earlier anthropocentric views of ‘man-apart-from-nature’”: 
 
But perhaps this movement toward a continuity with nature, a homogeneity or 
kinship between the human and the natural, is wrongheaded. This problematic 
tendency is also apparent in recent phenomenologically oriented approaches to 
environmental philosophy, for example, in recent attempts to establish a kinship 
of the human and the natural on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
corporeality and later ontology of flesh. Is environmental ethics best served by 
adopting this ‘humans-as-a-part-of-nature’ paradigm? (Toadvine 2005a, p. 139) 
 
His answer is no, environmental ethics is not best served by adopting the ‘humans-as-a-part-of-
nature’ paradigm. While he does not quite defend the necessity of postulating ontological 
difference in order to ground responsibility, Toadvine responds to such homogenization by 
highlighting a contrary tendency present in Merleau-Ponty’s work. 
If we would hold out hope for an ethical summons arising from within this ontological 
paradigm, Toadvine argues, it would have to come from close attention to that which resists 
phenomenological investigation. As his reflections on Merleau-Ponty, that which resists 
thematization, and problems of ethical import unfold, Toadvine eventually turns to Deleuze and 
Guattari and their notion of becoming animal as an implied, quasi-ethical means of working out 
what it means to attend to such sites of resistance.6 
While Husserl and other classical phenomenologists like Max Scheler surmounted the 
assumptions of Cartesian dualism by recognizing a layer of “animal sensibility” held in common 
with animals of other species, Merleau-Ponty alone “endorses something like an animal stratum 
of the human and finds in it the basis for what we will call a ‘strange kinship’” (Toadvine 2014, 
p. 111; henceforth Voices). Yet even Merleau-Ponty remains bound by Cartesian constraints, 
Toadvine suggests, when in his early work he refuses to recognize continuity, rather than a 
radical break, between animality and humanity. At least for the Merleau-Ponty of The Structure 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed description, see my forthcoming book review in Continental Philosophy Review. 
5 Especially as in the work of ecophenomenologists like David Abram (See Toadvine 2005b). 
6 “These sites of resistance are numerous and varied: the unconscious, dreams, madness, fatigue, the traumatic, the 
other, the ‘savage,’ the animal, the pre-reflective, birth, death, the back side of things. Each of these sites names a 
dilemma for phenomenology, an impossible dimension, an experience which cannot be thematized as such” 
(Toadvine 1999, p. 129). 
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of Behavior, “‘vital behavior as such disappears’ once our animality has been integrated into the 
higher and more encompassing gestalt of the human order.” With this claim, Toadvine maintains, 
Merleau-Ponty reproduces what Agamben has criticized as the “anthropological machine’s logic 
of inclusive exclusion,” whereby we humans construct ourselves with reference to the animals 
we are, and are not. 
In response, Toadvine contends that “admission of the contingency of death into 
Merleau-Ponty’s hierarchy of Gestalts destabilizes it, toppling it over” (Voices, p. 112). He 
continues,  
 
This is why Merleau-Ponty’s later work speaks of a lateral rather than a vertical 
transcendence, and why that transcendence can be understood as intertwining or 
chiasm. In the chiasmic relation, the animal becomes me and I become it, bringing 
this exchange very close to what Deleuze and Guattari call “blocks of becoming.” 
But this moment of exchange, the intersection of the chiasm, is a moment that 
exceeds the exchange itself. To understand this moment, we need to consider its 
strange temporality as a generative passivity. This generative moment is what 
Merleau-Ponty, in Phenomenology of Perception, names the “anonymous,” the 
someone who perceives within me without coinciding with my personal self, my 
Ego. This anonymous someone is precisely my animal life, the life of my body as 
a natural self. But this means that my animal self lives a different temporality than 
my personal ego, a time of Aeon or of a past that has never been present. (Voices, 
p. 112) 
 
“The Time of Animal Voices” seeks to tease out what exactly the presence of such an 
anonymous, animal self within would imply, doing so with reference to Deleuze and Guattari. 
Toadvine argues that the animal(s) which perceive from within me constitute “a virtual 
multiplicity” at the foundation of my being, and also that “my speech is the speaking through me 
of my own animal past.” Most importantly, “…when I gaze into the eyes of another, non-human 
animal, it is the animals within me, the animals of my own generative past, that look back.” All 
of these implications taken together proffer the promise of productive, or creative results in the 
moment of “mutual encounter.” Toadvine’s transition from the late Merleau-Ponty to the notion 
of becoming animal in Deleuze and Guattari works out what it would mean to attend to “sites of 
resistance” in Merleau-Ponty’s late writings, as a constructive resource for environmental ethics 
(Toadvine 1999, 2005a, 2005b, 2010). 
It seems to me that at bottom, Toadvine and McGrath really want the same thing: firmer 
grounding for ethical responsibility arising from within an ontological paradigm generally 
inherited from Spinoza, and without recourse to talk of intrinsic value. It therefore strikes me as 
strange that while aiming at the same thing, they end up endorsing what appear to be mutually 
opposed viewpoints. On the one hand, Toadvine eventually turns to Deleuze and Guattari, 
supplementing his emphasis on the point that “an ethical response to nature becomes possible 
only when we are faced with the impossibility of reducing it to the homogenous, the continuous, 
the predictable, the perceivable, the thematizable” (Toadvine 2005a, p. 140). On the other hand, 
McGrath turns against Deleuze and Guattari, or against the Deleuze-inspired “flattened ontology 
in which nothing is particularly good or evil” (Difference, p. 102). 
Further complicating our account, however, and lending credence to Toadvine’s 
Deleuzean turn, is the fact that in his earlier work on Schelling’s conception of the unconscious 
6  C. Rogers 
McGrath discloses that Schelling endorses a notion of “the productive unconscious, which is 
widely associated with Jung, and increasingly with Deleuze and Guattari, but whose historical 
inception is Schelling’s Naturphilosophie” (McGrath 2010, p. 85, emphasis mine). Indeed, 
McGrath argues quite winsomely in favor of the dissociative unconscious as an alternative to 
Freudian and Lacanian, tragic and repressive conceptions.7 
Our ostensible contradiction arises. On the one hand, McGrath endorses a Schellingian 
conception of the unconscious which coincides with the work of Deleuze and Guattari. But on 
the other hand, McGrath argues that their flattened ontological paradigm—akin, we add, in 
conjunction with Toadvine, to that of the later Merleau-Ponty—threatens to undermine any 
particularly human call to ethics. If this is indeed a contradiction it would seem to call into 
question McGrath’s endorsement of the Schellingian, productive unconscious, which is 
increasingly associated with the work of Deleuze and Guattari, and his opposition at the level of 
environmental ethics to the flattened ontology inspired by Deleuze and Guattari. 
Have we stumbled upon a case in which what would be ethically mindful is shipwrecked 
against what would be psychologically and therapeutically healthful? Perhaps the will to life 
stands in opposition to the otherworldly demands of morals, and one must choose health and the 
this-worldly over morality and an unhappy consciousness. Or is there a way the Schellingian 
conception of the unconscious, and psychological health, might coincide with, or perhaps even 
evoke specifically human calls to ethical responsibility? Moreover, recalling Toadvine’s 
concerns about deriving implications for environmental ethics from within the ontological 
paradigm of the late Merleau-Ponty, are Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological and ontological 
insights amenable to environmental responsibility, despite the flattened ontology? 
 
 
II. Befriending the Philosopher’s Shadow 
 
Again we take Toadvine’s ethical reflections as a point of departure. He follows Merleau-
Ponty so far as the limits of phenomenological investigation allow, and no further: “But perhaps 
the possibility of an ethical response to nature lies with the impossibility of trimming its claws 
for adoption as our sibling or household pet. Perhaps, as I will suggest here, an ethical response 
to nature becomes possible only when we are faced with the impossibility of reducing it to the 
homogeneous, the continuous, the predictable, the perceivable, the thematizable” (Toadvine 
2005a, p. 140). Emphasis on impossibility leads Toadvine to the surprising view that “What is 
                                                          
7 “The most serious problem with the Lacanian appropriation of Schelling is the imposition of a theory of repression 
onto the Schellingian unconscious. Nowhere does Schelling say that the unconscious is constituted by acts, contents, 
experiences, which are unconscious because subjectivity could not bear them. The Schellingian unconscious is not 
reactive but productive, not repressive but dissociative. Here we refer to a distinction between two broad classes of 
theories of the unconscious: the reactive unconscious, which is an effect of the loss and disowning of the 
individual’s past (of which Lacan’s is the most philosophically sophisticated account), and the productive 
unconscious, which is widely associated with Jung, and increasingly with Deleuze and Guattari, but whose historical 
inception is Schelling’s Naturphilosophie. The productive unconscious is the future-oriented, creative ground of the 
polymorphous self, a collective layer of potencies and possibilities that are for the most part unrecognized by the ego 
but that make possible the development and transformations the psyche undergoes in its progressive individuation. 
Where the theoreticians of the reactive unconscious have broken with the theosophico-romantic lineage of dynamic 
psychology, the advocates of the productive unconscious have actively elaborated and developed it” (McGrath 2010, 
pp. 85-86). 
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called for is not a new philosophy of nature, but an ethics of the impossibility of any ‘philosophy’ 
of nature.”8 
For the late Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, phenomenological investigation opens onto 
ontological speculation, clearing the space for a more robust philosophy of nature. We note that 
in using the language of “trimming nature’s claws,” Toadvine echoes Merleau-Ponty’s phrasing 
in his preface to Hesnard’s book on Freud. There he writes, 
 
There is no longer any great risk that Freudian research will shock us by recalling 
what there is of the “barbarian” in us; the risk is rather that its findings will be too 
easily accepted in an “idealist” form. …Today there is a race toward 
psychoanalysis, just as there was once a flight from it. Yesterday it was the spirit 
of evil; today one trims its claws and adopts it (Merleau-Ponty 1993, p. 70). 
 
With this invocation we return to the beginnings of Merleau-Ponty’s cryptic ontological proposal: 
“Do a Psychoanalysis of Nature.”9 The great insight recovered in Freudian research, Merleau-
Ponty maintains, is its recalling to consciousness “what there is of the ‘barbarian’ in us.” 
Investigations into the ground of conscious reflection lay bare a truth buried therein, a truth also 
brought to the fore in Schelling’s investigations of what he termed the barbarian principle. 
When Toadvine appropriates Merleau-Ponty’s language, arguing that the “possibility of an 
ethical response to nature” rests with “the impossibility of trimming its claws for adoption as our 
sibling or household pet,” he summons, unwittingly, the spirits of two key influences: Schelling 
and Freud. 
When Merleau-Ponty speaks of resistance, he doesn’t impose a stricture that one must 
not attempt to theorize any further on this basis. Additionally, for the late Merleau-Ponty, by 
contrast with Toadvine and in consort with Schelling, resistance is more than simply that which 
cannot be thematized, is not simply the “other side” of the phenomenon or the Janus face which 
never directly appears.10 The philosopher’s shadow implies a darkness which is more than mere 
privation: “The philosopher must bear his shadow,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “which is not simply 
the factual absence of future light” (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p. 178; henceforth Shadow). More than 
indiscernible deprivation or a nameless nullity, the barbarian principle which so thrilled the late 
Merleau-Ponty exceeds Toadvine’s seemingly passive conception of resistance. Merleau-Ponty 
continues, “What resists phenomenology within us—the natural being, the ‘barbarous’ source 
Schelling spoke of—cannot remain outside phenomenology and should have its place within it” 
(Shadow, p. 178). Direct attribution to Schelling, here in an essay on Husserl nearly 
contemporaneous with the preface to Hesnard, indicates acknowledgement of a drive or power 
which actively opposes the harmonizing, or totalizing tendencies of reason. This darker force is 
discovered when careful phenomenological description meets with an active resistance, opening 
the door to ontological speculation. 
To descend further along the path of descent charted by the late Merleau-Ponty, the 
downward and inward path toward the “substratum of consciousness,” with which the 
investigations of phenomenology and psychoanalysis increasingly come to a head and converge, 
                                                          
8 This is surprising because he would go on, literally, to write the book on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature 
(Toadvine, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy of Nature, 2009). 
9 Unfortunately, Toadvine does not address the Freudian and Lacanian lines of influence that begin to surface in the 
late Merleau-Ponty. Neither does he address this cryptic proposal. 
10 Cf. Toadvine 2010. 
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we must be willing to discover anew “what there is of the barbarian in us.” The very same 
insight into the dark ground of consciousness just “yesterday” led Freudian psychoanalysis to be 
regarded as the “spirit of evil.” To do any less than to attend carefully to this positive principle 
would be to trim its claws for adoption. But to do so we must, as Dylan Trigg has argued, return 
with Merleau-Ponty to his source in thinking such forbidden thoughts: to Schelling (Trigg 2016). 
The injunction to “Do a Psychoanalysis of Nature” is, after all, prefaced by the following 
Schellingian clue: “The sensible, Nature, transcend the past present distinction, realize from 
within a passage from one into the other Existential eternity. The indestructible, the barbaric 
Principle” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 267). Bringing to light what had remained hidden in 




III. The Barbarian Principle 
 
Commenting on Schelling’s thought in the Nature lectures, Merleau-Ponty uses the term 
barbarian principle synonymously with the more generic erste Natur, where the latter was in 
fact employed more characteristically in Schelling’s earlier work. Beginning from this equation, 
in the following section we’ll uncover, then seek to recover the ethical connotations of the 
barbarian principle, explicating two key passages from a text cited at one remove by Merleau-
Ponty: the 1815 draft of Schelling’s Ages of the World.11 Both appear in the following selection 
from the Nature lectures, which we’ll comment upon at length in what follows: 
 
We could speak, in Schelling, about a priority of existence over essence. This 
erste Natur is the most ancient element, “an abyss of the past,” which always 
remains present in us and in all things. Erste Natur is “the fundamental stuff of all 
life and of every existing being, something terrifying, a barbaric principle that one 
can overcome but never put aside.” It is an effort to explain this pre-being, which, 
as soon as we arrive on the scene, is always already there. This excess of Being 
over the consciousness of Being is what Schelling wants to think in all its rigor. 
Schelling tries to describe this “over-being” (Ubersein, in the sense of the word 
“surrealism”), which cannot be thought ahead of time, which is not yet posited by 
God, but which is in God a preliminary condition. He tries to engage himself in 
the “desert of Being” (Jaspers), in this erste Natur, where he sees a principle of 
God just as important as goodwill: the “anger of God,” the “destructive fire.” 
There is nothing solid in the history of Nature, where this undoubtedly destructive 
                                                          
11 Robert Vallier, translator of the Nature lectures into English, suggests that Merleau-Ponty may have remained 
unaware of this original source due to his reliance on secondary sources. In understanding and conveying 
Schelling’s philosophy, Merleau-Ponty draws liberally from the two works that were most readily available to him: 
Karl Jaspers’ Schelling, and Karl Löwith’s Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Vallier 
writes of Jaspers’ work that at the time it was “one of the only widely available commentaries on Schelling,” which 
Merleau-Ponty used “extensively in the preparation of the materials on Schelling.” He writes of Löwith’s book that 
one of its primary aims is to “link [Nietzsche’s] thought to its precedents in German philosophy, notably Kant, 
Hegel and Schelling” (Nature, pp. 289-290n1, n4). Of the latter, Vallier continues, “Merleau-Ponty seems to have 
used this text extensively in the preparation of the materials on Schelling’s philosophy of nature, sometimes 
paraphrasing it in his lecture” (ibid., p. 290n4). Löwith discusses Schelling for a total of five pages, but his analysis 
is very impressive. See Löwith 1997, pp. 145-149. 
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and savage but nevertheless necessary force is ignored. Thus the eighteenth 
century was the epoch when we lost sight of the principle of anger and selfishness. 
Schelling sees in his time “a world which is no longer but an image, and even an 
image of an image, nothing of nothing. Humans are only, in their turn, images, 
dreams. A people, in this laudable effort toward enlightenment…dissolves 
everything into thought and dissolves all forms with obscurity, this barbaric 
principle, the source of all grandeur and all beauty.” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, p. 38; 
henceforth Nature) 
 
In the first quotations of Schelling in this passage we find Merleau-Ponty paraphrasing, in 
translation, citations of Schelling found in Löwith’s book on Nietzsche. Löwith mistakenly 
attributes them to an extremely early essay by Schelling, in fact one his very first publications.12 
Among other consequences, this inexactitude may have contributed to Merleau-Ponty’s failure to 
distinguish between erste Natur as theorized in Schelling’s earlier works, and the barbarian 
principle as theorized in the works of his middle period. Using them interchangeably, he glosses 
over deepened ontological and psychological connotations, and the ethical implications, which 
accrue to the latter. 
Translator Robert Vallier underplays this confusion, also glossing the significance 
assumed by the latter term. 13  By contrast, we argue that above and beyond the aesthetic 
considerations surrounding the notion of erste Natur, a term clearly less ethically charged, the 
barbarian principle denotes key developments which surfaced in Schelling’s Freedom essay and 
which he had developed further in The Ages of the World. The context from which these citations 
have been pulled—and indeed portions of the final passage cited from the Ages of the World 
which have been cut, in Merleau-Ponty’s quotations at secondhand—indicate as much. These 
together gesture in the direction of an ethical paradigm which implies an answer to our original 
problem. Thus a deeper, darker, and more contextualized understanding of the barbarian 
principle provides an untapped resource for those of us who, with Toadvine and McGrath, seek 
to salvage grounds for environmental responsibility according to ontological paradigm inherited 
from Spinoza, albeit at one or more removes. 
 The first of Merleau-Ponty’s quotations of The Ages of the World combines Merleau-
Ponty’s paraphrase of Löwith’s paraphrase with Löwith’s quotation of a passage occurring a 
couple of pages later. The full text from Löwith’s book reads, “The basic material of all life and 
existence, according to Schelling and Nietzsche alike, is the terrible: a blind power and force, a 
barbaric principle that can be overcome but can never be eliminated, and that is ‘the foundation 
of all greatness of beauty’” (Löwith 1997, p. 149). 14  Merleau-Ponty excludes Löwith’s 
                                                          
12 Vallier recounts, “These last words are Schelling’s and are erroneously attributed by Löwith to SW 1:222, which 
is in the middle of “Of the I as a Principle of Philosophy” (1795); no such passage is to be found there, and the 
French editors did not correct the error” (Nature, p. 290n8). At the time of that essay’s publication Schelling was 
only 20 years old, still under the influence of Fichte’s transcendental idealism. 
13 He writes elsewhere, “Now even though Schelling does not explicitly deploy ‘barbarian principle’ as a predicate 
for Nature until the sketches for The Ages of the World, it—and along with it, the problem of ground—[...] is present 
in his early works. During the ‘period’ of his Naturphilosophie, he names it erste Natur” (Vallier 2013, p. 131). 
14 In Merleau-Ponty’s citation the reference to Nietzsche drops out. This reference will become significant later in 
our discussion. 
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constructive comparison of Schelling with Nietzsche, along with the subtle indication that the 
barbarian principle can be overcome but never eliminated.15 
The initial portion of this text is Löwith’s paraphrase of the end of a passage that appears 
almost at the end of Schelling’s 1815 draft of The Ages of the World. Placed back into context, in 
that passage Schelling actually draws a distinction which brings further clarity to our larger 
concerns involving Deleuze, Spinoza, and environmental ethics.16 We find Schelling addressing 
two groups of thinkers that had claimed the name of pantheism, with each group succumbing in 
its own way to an ontological enticement still entertained by environmental thinkers today.17 
Schelling’s claim is that both have failed to glimpse the broader picture which the “real” 
pantheism of his middle period sought to paint: 
 
Now, those who have recently talked so much about pantheism may now see what 
it really is. For most people who speak of the One and the Many only see the 
Many therein. They have not even once noticed that there is a One, a subject, 
therein. But by the many they understand that selfless totality that the initial 
nature is. This group also includes those who eternally reiterate the assurance of 
the harmony and wonderfully blessed unity of the cosmos, something that already 
long ago become a burden to any sensible person. Both groups would no doubt 
find real pantheism to be horrifying. But were they capable of penetrating the 
exterior surface of things, they would see that the true prime matter of all life and 
existence is precisely what is horrifying. (Schelling 2000, p. 104; emphasis mine; 
henceforth Ages)18 
 
While the one group seeks to ignite the spark of desire to lose one’s singularity in 
wholeheartedly embracing an animalistic multiplicity, the other fans the flame of longing to 
return to lost primal unity, to the continuous fabric of a harmonious universe in which reflective 
consciousness is no longer alienated from mother nature. 
The first group consists of those who’ve become so enamored of multiplicity that they 
seek to eradicate the human subject, or self.19 The second is comprised of those who insist on 
cosmic harmony and universal unity to the exclusion of a contrary principle found also within 
                                                          
15 But this paraphrase is itself misleading, insofar as it implies that the ideal would be to eliminate it. As we’ll see, 
Schelling’s ideal is not elimination, but redirection. 
16 This is especially the case when placed back into dialogue with Nietzsche, who, in addition to Spinoza, holds a 
place of principal influence in Deleuze’s thought. 
17 Steve Vogel captured at least one of these well when he classified conceptions of nature in environmental 
philosophy as falling under one of two categories: nature as origin or nature as difference (see Vogel 1998). Both 
groups criticized by Schelling in the passage cited next, it seems to me, can be classified as adhering to a regressive 
conception of nature as origin. The middle Schelling might perhaps be classified as seeking to counterbalance such 
emphasis, which corresponds to his early Naturphilosophie, by presenting a (qualified) view of “nature” as 
difference. We saw in our first section that in responding to those who attempt to derive an ethics of kinship on the 
basis of Merleau-Ponty’s thought—a regressive conception of nature as origin, in other words—Toadvine relies 
upon a contrary tendency in the late Merleau-Ponty. This move echoes that of the middle Schelling. Toadvine’s 
emphasis on an ethics of the “impossibility” of any philosophy of nature means that he refuses to entertain the full 
conclusion toward which we’ve been working. But as we’ve seen, the late Merleau-Ponty relies upon the very 
principle we’re seeking to elucidate in context, about which Toadvine remains conspicuously silent: the barbarian 
principle. 
18 Emphasis mine, highlighting the line from this passage paraphrased by Löwith and cited by Merleau-Ponty. 
19  Read, for our larger purposes: Deleuze and the posthumanists. We’ll attempt to justify the inclusion of 
“animalistic” before “multiplicity,” on Schelling’s own terms, in our next and final section. 
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nature, the principle of resistance emphasized by both Toadvine, pace Merleau-Ponty, and by the 
middle Schelling.20 The problem is that both groups fail to acknowledge the “horrifying” nature 
of the chaos underlying natural order, the dark ground of Spirit. This means that both evade the 
conclusion that when fully actualized in the willed acts of a human individual, the barbarian 
principle unleashes into the world of nature the force of real, positive evil. 
 Connecting back to our larger environmental concerns, we note on the one hand that in 
his opposition to that “flattened ontology in which nothing is particularly good or evil,” Sean 
McGrath follows Schelling in waging a response to both of the groups here in question.21 On the 
other hand, in Toadvine’s move from the phenomenological ontology of the late Merleau-
Ponty—which, we’ve maintained, smacks of implicit Spinozism—to his contention that “an 
ethical response to nature becomes possible only when we are faced with the impossibility of 
reducing it to the homogenous, the continuous, the predictable, the perceivable, the thematizable,” 
the resistance he seeks to foreground is waged in reaction to a Merleau-Pontean iteration of the 
second group. 
Toadvine’s response to those who would attempt to derive an ethics of kinship on the 
basis of Merleau-Ponty’s late ontology mirrors a crucial concern of the middle Schelling, and 
McGrath: a phenomenon of crucial ethical import, a real phenomenon, has been ignored or 
repressed when the barbarian principle is jettisoned in attempts to satisfy regressive longings for 
a lost primal unity. Merleau-Ponty would appear to affirm this shared concern: “There is nothing 
solid in the history of Nature, where this undoubtedly destructive and savage but nevertheless 
necessary force is ignored” (Nature, p. 38). But by contrast with Schelling, and to a lesser extent 
also with Merleau-Ponty, Toadvine restricts his own project in such a way as to preclude 
reflection on the abuses of a specifically human freedom, and the abdication of a specifically 
human responsibility, in a manner that gives rise to real, positive evil. 
 Toadvine comes to side with Deleuze and Guattari, endorsing their notion of becoming 
animal as a quasi-ethical supplement to his earlier work on an ethics based in the notion of 
resistance. While he rightly criticizes those who would capitalize on the regressive tendency in 
the work of Merleau-Ponty in the name of an ethics of kinship, Toadvine’s embracing of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s becoming animal would appear to align him squarely with the first group 
pinpointed by Schelling, criticized by both Schelling and McGrath for its suspect ethical 
consequences. Becoming animal epitomizes abandonment of singularity in favor of animalistic 
multiplicity, an eschewal of the subject, or self, to be lost in the furor of group or mass 
psychology. 
 Löwith paraphrases the last line of the aforementioned passage—“But were they capable 
of penetrating the exterior surface of things, they would see that the true prime matter of all life 
and existence is precisely what is horrifying”—and combines it with a quotation from the last 
line of a passage occurring a few pages later. That latter line is in fact drawn from the end of the 
second passage quoted by Merleau-Ponty, at the end of our long citation from his Nature lectures. 
This second, much longer quotation of The Ages of the World concludes with a paraphrased and 
elided declaration that the barbarian principle simply is the source or foundation of all greatness 
of beauty. According to Schelling’s original, however, as the larger context of Löwith’s 
                                                          
20 Read: deep ecology, and certain iterations of environmental Spinozism. 
21 In Thinking Nature, McGrath addresses both of these even more explicitly. Consider the following passage, in 
response to the first group: “But every effort to forget ourselves, every descent into some pre-personal ersatz unio 
mystica—psychedelics, mosh pits, radical protests, war, sex, or just plain drunkenness—is followed by the painful 
return of distance we thought we had abolished and, with it, moral anxiety, either in the form of regret or, even more 
simply, sorrow that the unio was so temporary, and to that degree a lie” (McGrath 2019, p. 91). 
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discussion of Schelling makes clear, the barbarian principle does not by itself beget greatness 
and beauty. Quite the opposite: apart from human freedom used in service of the Good, this 
principle is the source of the destruction of greatness and beauty, lending to the implosion or 
self-destruction of life.22 
In a very Nietzschean vein, the second, more substantive quotation of Schelling offers a 
criticism of Enlightenment enthusiasts whose ratification of a cold, calculated, abstract 
rationalizing has led to the denial, as opposed to the affirmation of life. Much like both Nietzsche 
and Spinoza, two principal influences for Deleuze, Schelling strives to put his finger on the 
sources of fundamental vitality underlying the fecundity of the more-than-human world.23 Just 
before this passage, in the Ages of the World, he writes, “No doubt, when German idealism 
emerged in its highest intensification with Fichte, the fundamental thought of the I, that is, of a 
living unity of that which has being and Being, aroused the hope of an elevated Spinozism that 
led to what is vital” (Ages, p. 106). The ultimate hope is for a position which would take 
Spinozist insights up into a higher standpoint, elevated above abstract formalism and the 
mechanistic conception of nature Spinoza had endorsed. Schelling stipulates elsewhere that such 
a viewpoint must refuse to abandon the “I” after the manner of those who, inspired by Spinozist 
yearnings, seek the loss of the “self” in multiplicity.24 
Yet we cannot deny Spinoza’s positive influence. Of all early moderns he stands out as 
having intimated from far off, and then suffused into his abstract system, elusive reverberations 
of Spirit’s dark ground: “Far be it from us to deny in Spinoza that for which he was our teacher 
and predecessor. Perhaps, of all the modern philosophers, there was in Spinoza a dark feeling of 
that primordial time of which we have attempted to conceptualize so precisely” (Ages, p. 104). 
These echoes reverberate down through Schelling’s work to the late Merleau-Ponty, providing a 
late supplement to his earlier, incisive phenomenological intimations of a “past that has never 
been present,” abiding in the substratum of consciousness (Merleau-Ponty 2012, p. 252). Indeed, 
the desire to wrestle with and bring to light “a dark feeling of that primordial time” characterizes 
well what Merleau-Ponty is after in his late lecture courses on Nature, which end by addressing 
                                                          
22 Schelling’s line is as follows: “But, along with the darkness, they lost all might and that (let the right word stand 
here) barbaric principle that, when overcome but not annihilated, is the foundation of all greatness and beauty” 
(Ages, p. 106, emphasis mine). Vallier concedes, “Löwith’s gloss conveniently summarizes the two passages, and 
Merleau-Ponty seems to rely on it more than on the original text itself” (Merleau-Ponty 2003, p. 291n8). But in the 
service of convenience, perhaps the most important element of this quotation has been cut out. To be sure, such 
omission does serve well Löwith’s affirmative comparison between Schelling and Nietzsche—a comparison which 
Merleau-Ponty has omitted from his own citation. 
23 Recall, in this context, McGrath’s characterization of “the productive unconscious” as “widely associated with 
Jung, and increasingly with Deleuze and Guattari, but whose historical inception is Schelling’s Naturphilosophie” 
(McGrath 2010, p. 85). 
24 McGrath explains, “Despite the progressive turn away from transcendental philosophy, Schelling never abandons 
the transcendental method vouchsafed to consciousness by virtue of its capacity to self-reflect. Reflection may be 
ultimately inadequate to grasping the absolute but it remains the principal tool of philosophy. Philosophy must use it 
until it can no longer proceed and reflection itself begins to reveal its own limits. Spinoza’s lack of a transcendental 
method causes him intractable problems. He grasps the ideal only in contradistinction to the real; both are merely 
given for Spinoza without any clear sense of why they are given, that is, of why the ideal – real opposition exists in 
the first place. In Schelling’s view, Spinoza’s crucial insight into the correlativity of the ideal and the real should 
have led him into ‘the depths of his self-consciousness.’ Instead Spinoza literally loses himself in the object’” 
(McGrath 2012, p. 86). 
JOURNAL OF THE PACIFIC ASSOCIATION FOR THE CONTINENTAL TRADITION 13 
 
the concept of animality, discovered in the artifacts left behind by earlier humans and in an 
unconscious, never-present past.25 
 By contrast with Spinoza’s subtle intimations of Spirit’s dark ground, Schelling’s 
Enlightenment-influenced contemporaries have endorsed the cold calculations of abstract reason 
to the exclusion of all “darkness.” Refusing to grapple with the philosopher’s shadow, they’ve 
repressed that which, when rightly ordered by reason, has the potential to become the source of 
all greatness and beauty. Schelling speaks of the shadow-world created by these thinkers, and 
their diminished existence within it: 
 
This is a world that is still just an image, nay, an image of an image, a nothing of 
nothing, a shadow of a shadow. These are people who are nothing but images, just 
dreams of shadows. This is a people that, in the good-natured endeavor toward so-
called Enlightenment, really arrived at the dissolution of everything into thoughts. 
But, along with the darkness, they lost all might and that (let the right word stand 
here) barbaric principle that, when overcome but not annihilated, is the foundation 
of all greatness and beauty. (Ages, p. 106) 
 
Abstract machinations devoid of darkness, Apollonian abstractions devoid of Dionysiac madness, 
beget a hollow shell of a world in which all that is really vital has been vitiated. With Merleau-
Ponty, we declare in response: “The philosopher must bear his shadow” (Shadow, p. 178). But 
again, that shadow is “not simply the factual absence of future light.” 
Spinoza intimated echoes of the dark ground of existence. But mere intimations fail to 
capture the full situation at play here, both ontologically and ethically. The middle Schelling 
comes to argue that a positive principle lies beneath, the power of which exceeds merely passive 
conceptions of nature’s resistance. Though he also fails to proceed very far beyond initial 
intimations, Merleau-Ponty follows Schelling partway: “What resists phenomenology within 
us—the natural being, the ‘barbarous’ source Schelling spoke of—cannot remain outside 
phenomenology and should have its place within it” (Shadow, p. 178). Repression of darkness 
begets a world that is the mere shadow of a shadow of reality, neutered and bereft of Dionysiac 
bark and bite. Darkness repressed merely forces the terrors underground, into the substratum of 
consciousness, twice removed from the light of so-called enlightenment. Having refused to 
befriend the philosopher’s shadow, “enlightened” thought is rendered impotent: “nothing but 
images, just dreams of shadows.” 
                                                          
25 A key difference between Schelling and Merleau-Ponty is the one we’ve been explicating: Schelling’s attempts to 
“conceptualize so precisely” this “dark feeling of that primordial time” lead to his ontological theorization of the 
barbarian principle as the natural ground of positive evil. To elaborate further, concerning rigorous 
conceptualization: whereas Merleau-Ponty refuses systematization in the service of phenomenological description, 
Schelling does not. Sebastian Gardner has argued quite forcefully, however: “…the problem facing Merleau-Ponty 
has the following form. If what is claimed in Schelling’s Real-Idealismus is incoherent, then it avails nothing to try 
the same (sort of) thing in a mode putatively free from systematic pretensions. Switching from Wissenschaft to 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological-ontological idiom cannot salvage anything, for it is only by tacitly converting 
his claims back into systematic doctrines that they can be understood as candidates for truth. Ramsey’s dictum, that 
what cannot be said cannot be whistled either, applies in the present case. If the ontology of V&I [The Visible and 
the Invisible] is not ‘mere metaphor’ but has philosophical truth, then the same must be said for Real-Idealismus, in 
which case the question must be faced of how they relate to one another—to which the most convincing answer is 
provided, I have suggested, by the para-aesthetic reading of V&I and its subordination to Real-Idealismus” (Gardner 
2017, p. 23). 
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Greatness and beauty are elicited when the barbarian principle “within us” is 
acknowledged, then harnessed in pursuit of the Good. With this positive injunction we’ve gone 
well beyond Spinoza, and Schelling writes in the Freedom essay that what Spinoza’s skeleton of 
a system really needs is to be infused with the “warm breath of love” (Schelling 2006, p. 21).26 
Madness boiling beneath the surface of consciousness must to be brought out into the light and 
integrated for the sake of a higher ethical ideal, the ideal of love. 
 
 
IV. Dionysiac Madness 
 
The “barbarian” in “barbarian principle” evokes ancient conceptions of unordered chaos 
preceding rationalized order, the uncivilized cruelty of non-Greek raiders contrasted with the 
cultivated civility—and “civilized” cruelty—of the Greeks. It also recalls primordial pleasure in 
acts of active destruction.27 Vallier elaborates, “The destructive face of Nature is underscored in 
Schelling’s description of it as a barbarian principle; borrowing from the Greek EάUEDUR9, 
signifying the strange, the foreign, the savage, the uncultivated non-Greeks who would invade 
and ravage the Greek Appoline civilization, what is barbaric and terrible is thus linked to a 
Dionysian irrationality” (Vallier 2013, p. 132). Three decades before Nietzsche’s birth, Schelling 
                                                          
26 What Schelling means when he makes this claim can be explained by context: “Or does one doubt that the basic 
views of Spinozism must already be essentially changed by a dynamic notion of nature? If the doctrine that all 
things are contained in God is the ground of the whole system, then, at the very least, it must first be brought to life 
and torn from abstraction before it can become the principle of a system of reason” (Schelling 2006, p. 20). He goes 
on to describe that one must breathe life into Spinoza’s abstract system to make it dynamic, anticipating passages 
from the Ages of the World which we’ve discussed above: “How general are the expressions that finite beings are 
modifications or consequences of God; what a gulf there is to fill here, what questions there are to answer! One 
could look at the rigidity of Spinozism as at Pygmalion’s statue that had to be made animate through the warm 
breath of love; but this comparison is incomplete since Spinozism is more like a work sketched out only in barest 
outline in which many still missing or unfinished features would first become noticeable if it were made animate. It 
would be preferable to compare Spinozism to the most ancient images of divinities which appear that much more 
mysterious the less their features bespoke individuality and liveliness. In a word, it is a one-sidedly realist system, 
which expression indeed sounds less damning than pantheism, yet indicates what is characteristic of the system far 
more correctly and is also not employed here for the first time. It would be irksome to repeat the many explanations 
that have been made concerning this point in the author’s [own] early writings. A mutual saturation of realism and 
idealism in each other was the declared intent of his efforts. Spinoza’s basic concept, when infused by spirit (and, in 
one essential point, changed) by the principle of idealism, received a living basis in the higher forms of investigation 
of nature and the recognized unity of the dynamic with the emotional and spiritual; out of this grew the philosophy 
of nature, which as pure physics was indeed able to stand for itself, yet at any time in regard to the whole of 
philosophy was only considered as a part, namely the real part that would be capable of rising up into the genuine 
system of reason only through completion by the ideal part in which freedom rules. It was claimed that in this rising 
up (of freedom) the final empowering act was found through which all of nature transfigured itself in feeling, 
intelligence, and finally, in will. In the final and highest judgment, there is no other Being than will. Will is primal 
Being to which alone all predicates of Being apply: groundlessness, eternality, independence from time, self-
affirmation. All of philosophy strives only to find this highest expression” (ibid., pp. 20-21). Since the early 
Naturphilosophie, in other words, Schelling’s entire philosophical development has been characterized by an 
attempt to breathe life into Spinoza’s abstract and lifeless system—and also, we add, to compensate nature for the 
mishandling it suffered in Fichte’s (to paraphrase Hegel, from the Difference essay). 
27 Recall Nietzsche’s desire to redirect a certain set of instincts—which have been repressed in the name of morality, 
but which nevertheless demand satisfaction—toward their proper mode of discharge. He refers to these under the 
banner of a drive (Trieb) toward “Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction” 
(Nietzsche 1989, pp. 84-85). 
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forges a positive connection between the barbarian principle and the notion of Dionysiac 
madness. 
 The passages from The Ages of the World which we’ve discussed come from the very last 
pages of Schelling’s 1815 draft, in an appended section: “General Discussion of the Doctrine of 
Pantheism Developed Here.”28 Interestingly, just before this brief appendix we find an explicit 
discussion of madness: 
 
The ancients did not speak in vain of a divine and holy madness. We even see 
nature, in the process of its free unfolding, becoming, in proportion to its 
approach to spirit, ever more, so to speak, frenzied. (…) Panthers or tigers do not 
pull the carriage of Dionysus in vain. For this wild frenzy of inspiration in which 
nature found itself when it was in view of the being was celebrated in the nature 
worship of prescient ancient peoples by the drunken festivals of Bacchic orgies. 
(Ages, pp. 102-103) 
 
Ancient processions like these were accompanied by the “din of a coarse music that is partly 
deafening and partly lacerating.” Anticipating the ruminations of the young Nietzsche, Schelling 
continues, “For nothing is more similar to that inner madness than music, which, through the 
incessant eccentric relinquishing and re-attracting of tones, most clearly imitates that primordial 
movement” (Ages, p. 103).29 
The statement that follows marks the point at which the paths of Nietzsche and Schelling 
would appear to part ways. Nietzsche—or, his more recent disciples in particular—seeks to 
cultivate health in the liberation of Dionysiac desire. Shattering the shackles of society and of 
morals, the ultimate aim on the Nietzschean account—at very least, in the positive account 
developed by Deleuze—must be to bring about new configurations of power and new 
possibilities of knowledge.30 By contrast, for Schelling and for his pupils, the goal would have to 
be the liberation and integration of Dionysiac desire for the sake of higher psychological and 
ethical ends.31 Schelling himself is very clear: only when darkness is taken up and transfigured 
by the power of light, “Only when it is governed and, so to speak, verified, through the light of a 
higher intellect,” can darkness be transformed into true might, and utilized in service of the Good 
(Ages, p. 103). 
Charting a path for his criticism of those who endeavor toward a world of “so-called 
Enlightenment,” Schelling delineates four possibilities for one’s internal relation to Dionysiac 
madness. The first two are repressive. First, one might become the person in whom madness is 
                                                          
28 The section is subtitled, “The Necessity of a Higher Realism: Spinoza,” to which is added: “Fichte and the 
Philosophy of Nature” (Ages, p. 104). 
29 These lines are succeeded by a comment that must have piqued Löwith’s comparative interest in writing about 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence: “Music itself is a turning wheel that, going out from a single point, 
always, through all excesses, spins back again to the beginning” (Ages, p. 103). True to the works of Schelling’s 
middle period, the declarations in these quotations stand at a midpoint between the role played by art in the self-
revelation of Being, in Schelling’s earlier writings, and the role mythology plays in revealing the personality of God, 
in the late lectures. In the Weltalter context, he goes on to reference the self-flaying rage, and even auto-castration of 
the priests of the cult of the earth goddess, Cybele. Jason Wirth explains that the cult of Cybele was transformed into 
the cult of Demeter, giving rise to the Eleusinian mysteries (Ages, p. 148n118). 
30 The liberation of desire which characterizes Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming animal portends the 
overthrow of capitalist, and Freudian constraints. 
31 For example, as McGrath has pointed out, in the underrecognized “Schelling school of romantic psychiatry” 
(McGrath 2012, p. 17). 
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simply absent: “These would be the uncreative people incapable of procreation, the ones they 
call sober spirits” (Ages, p. 103). Secondly, one might resort to imbecility, or the utter rejection 
and repression of a madness that is in fact present within. 
By contrast, the last two are positive, or progressive, insofar as their aim is attainment of 
a holistic kind of health. In the third case one might become a person who governs madness 
rightly, and “in this overwhelming shows the highest force of the intellect” (Ages, pp. 103-104). 
This is the position endorsed by Schelling, in which the dark ground of Spirit is taken up and 
transformed by the light. Fourthly and finally, one might become a person who acknowledges the 
power of the Dionysiac and gives free reign to the madness within, allowing oneself to be 
governed by it. This is would be the Nietzschean retrieval, expressed in the notion of becoming 
animal and its Deleuzean archetype: Melville’s Ahab.32 
Both of the latter options are therapeutically healthful, coinciding with the will to life. In 
the absence of an explicit ethical defense of the Nietzschean-Deleuzean position, however, it 
appears to us that only the third is both therapeutically healthful and ethically mindful. We end 
with a mere suggestion, which future work will need to corroborate: according to this schema, it 
would appear that the fourth relation—giving oneself over to be governed by Dionysiac 
madness—might very well be implicated at the roots of our ecologic crisis. If this is in fact the 
case, then by extension, taking up the notion of becoming animal as a quasi-ethical means of 
embracing animality would serve only to heighten the crisis, not to eradicate it. By contrast, the 
Schellingian path of integration would cut to the very roots of the crisis and offer up, for further 





It’s only in recognizing a tendency toward destruction within nature itself, a nature of 
which we are a/part, that we can begin to acknowledge particularly human calls to ethical 
responsibility. 34  Unfortunately, Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Schelling’s barbarian principle 
glosses over this insight and its implications. But the investigations of the middle Schelling, 
arising from deepened reflections on the problem of ground, acknowledge and indicate a need to 
come to terms with this tendency, at once wholly “natural” and all-too-human. 
 Holistic integration would require a Schellingian analog to Toadvine’s attentiveness to 
resistance, and Merleau-Ponty’s proposed descent into the depths of consciousness: “One must 
occasionally descend, awaken the ground, the madness beneath consciousness, and ensure that 
our ‘virtues’ do not become a thin disguise for our vices. Becoming a person for Schelling is a 
continual transmutation not only of the base into the sublime, but also of the sublime into the 
base” (McGrath 2012, p. 111). As Toadvine has pointed out, the thought of the late Merleau-
                                                          
32 See Deleuze and Guattari 1987, p. 243ff. 
33 In returning to the Schellingian roots of the late Merleau-Ponty’s notion of resistance, and the barbarian principle 
which underlies it, the present paper has addressed both senses in which Merleau-Ponty’s injunction to “Do a 
Psychoanalysis of Nature” can be taken up, according to Laura McMahon: “First, it might be taken as the demand to 
give voice to the deep sense of a nature, conceived in terms of unconscious desire rather than scientific rationality, 
that precedes and exceeds human life. Second, we might do a psychoanalysis of our relationship to nature, of the 
ways in which modern thought tends to deny and repress the unconscious, organic desire at its heart” (McMahon 
2014, p. 289). 
34 With this we’ve moved from ontological speculation to ethical implication, expressly with reference to the notions 
of resistance, the barbarian principle, and Dionysiac madness. 
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Ponty progressively belies an archeological orientation, where his focus has shifted increasingly 
toward the origins of perception in a common flesh. In this way the teleological, or forward-
looking tendency of his thought is slowly eclipsed.35 
But with environmental implications in mind, for our purposes archeological orientation 
alone will not suffice. Lest we invite another generation given over to the egoistic self-interest 
epitomized by Melville’s Ahab, we must take care that the path of descent is supplemented with 
a path of ascent, toward the Good—and what exactly we mean by the Good must be worked out 
in greater detail, perhaps with reference to the Platonic legacy in Schelling’s thought. To do any 
less than to work out such a supplement would be to hasten the demise of the ship of the earth. 
And yet, the barbarian principle cannot continue to go ignored: “for in philosophy, as in Dante’s 
poem, the path toward heaven leads through the abyss” (Schelling 2014, p. 31). To embrace the 
darkness, aiming at an integrative ideal of love: such would be the dual task of psychoanalyzing 




                                                          
35 Toadvine 2009, p. 84. 
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